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Abstract 
This paper explores the financial implications of fiscal decentralization policies on the 
central government's operating budget in Kenya. The paper evaluates how devolved funds under 
the constituency development fund (CDF) have been utilized to start healthcare capital projects 
(clinics) at the local level. The study finds that fiscal decentralization has promoted allocative 
efficiency and equity but at a cost of exporting tax burdens (operations and maintenance) to the 
central government emanating from capital projects implemented at the local level. The exported 
tax burdens have policy implications and call for reforms of the CDF program to reflect a 
benefit-expenditure structure. 
Introduction 
Like other developing countries, Kenya has been haunted by the issue of equity in 
resource redistribution.  Since independence in 1963, the Kenyan government has formulated an 
array of decentralization programs, among them the District Development Grant Program 
(1966), the Special Rural Development Program (1969/1970), District Development Planning 
(1971), the District Focus for Rural Development (1983 -84) and the Rural Trade and Production 
Center (198-89). Though ingenious, these programs suffered the same fate – a lack of funding 
and excessive bureaucratic capture by the central government (Ogutu, 1989; Khadiagala & 
Mitullah, 2004).  
It is from this background that in 2003 the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was 
created. The CDF is a program that was established in 2003 through an act of parliament with the 
aim of ironing out regional imbalances brought about by patronage politics by providing funds to 
parliamentary jurisdictions (constituencies) to fight poverty. The program was designed to fight 
poverty through the implementation of development projects at the local level and particularly 
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those that provide basic needs such as education, healthcare, water, agricultural services, security 
and electricity.  
The CDF program comprises of an annual budgetary allocation equivalent to 2.5% of the 
total national revenue, though the Kenya parliament recently passed a motion to increase the 
fund to 7.5% of the total national revenue. Allocations to the 210 parliamentary jurisdictions are 
clearly spelled out in the CDF Act, where 75% of the fund is allocated equally among all 210 
constituencies. The remaining 25% is allocated based on constituency poverty levels, population 
size and the size of the constituency. A maximum 10% of each constituency’s annual allocation 
is used for education bursary schemes, 3% for administration and 5% for rainy day fund for each 
constituency.  Since its inception, the CDF kitty has grown from a paltry Ksh. 126,000,000 (U.S. 
$1,938,461) for 2003/04 fiscal year to Ksh. 10,304,805,060 (U.S. $158,535,462) for 2007/08 
fiscal year. Figure 1 below shows the trend of yearly allocations for the CDF program for fiscal 
years 2003/2004 – 2007/2008. 
Figure 1 
     
Source: Government of Kenya (GOK) website: http://www.cdf.go.ke 
Accessed on 3/4/2008. 
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While this yearly allocations may not appear to be much, its impact both physically and 
socially at the community level has been phenomenal. For instance, through the CDF funds, 
many schools have been built and equipped. This has aided the government’s policy of providing 
free primary school education. In the health sector, many hospitals, dispensaries, maternity wings 
within existing health facilities and clinics have been built in record time. This has helped 
decongest larger district level hospitals. Additionally, the CDF has helped crime-prone areas to 
construct police posts which the central government has been quick to bring into operation to 
reaffirm its commitment to public safety. Given the mosaic of expenditure decisions on a myriad 
of local projects and because of the relaxed rules on how and where expenditure is to be 
incurred, the CDF can be construed as a delegated form of fiscal decentralization because the 
program allows local people to make their own expenditure decisions that reflect their tastes and 
preferences and maximizes their welfare.  
A look at the implementation of CDF in recent years reveals a mismatch between the 
local nature of capital expenditure decisions and financing for the operations and maintenance of 
such projects with local benefits. For example, in recent years the central government has been 
forced to step in to bring into operation local healthcare capital projects such as clinics 
constructed through the CDF. Because the central government holds a policy monopoly on 
healthcare policy, it is evident that when it steps in to bring such projects into operation, those 
who benefit from those operational projects do not incur the recurrent costs of operating and 
maintaining their capital projects  
Such mismatch however, are no accidents given the politics and discretion of capital 
spending. Politically, the symbolism attached to ribbon-cutting ceremonies that mark the opening 
of new projects such as hospitals, schools, roads, police stations, water boreholes and irrigation 
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systems enable politicians to showcase their accomplishments at the local level.  Given the 
discretionary nature of capital spending1 and the intrinsic value attached to such political 
symbolism, more often, new projects are undertaken while the existing ones are either left to 
deteriorate or are inadequately funded (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998). Additionally, when local 
politicians are voted out and new ones elected, the new leaders may take advantage of Section 21 
(3) of the CDF act2 to avoid “bending” the CDF rules and sideline funding for new capital 
projects or funding for maintenance of projects initiated by their opponents for two reasons. 
First, they may use their power to make a political statement by starting new projects to 
showcase their abilities. And second, newly elected leaders may want to use their power to 
initiate projects that reward their supporters while ignoring projects started by their opponents 
which they might associate with their opponents’ political downfall.  
The mismatch between projects’ benefits at the constituency level and the “true” 
operating cost of such projects creates three problems. First, since the central government bears 
the cost of operating some CDF-funded projects like clinics its overall operating cost is likely to 
grow. Second, given that the central government’s general fund is predominantly derived from 
the general taxation of its population, CDF’s healthcare projects that transfer their recurrent costs 
to the central government are likely to consume and diminish the central government’s general 
fund. Lastly, at the constituency level, the fiscal effects of one or two police posts or clinics or 
schools may not be fathomed, though collectively, at the national level, such financial effects 
                                                        
1 Capital spending is highly discretionary both in terms of its composition and its basic decisions. Often, local 
politicians decide the amount to be spent on each capital project, the choice of specific projects and their 
geographical location including the design of each project. See, Tanzi V. & Hamid, D. (1998). Roads to Nowhere: 
How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts Growth. International Monetary Fund. 
 
2 Part IV Section 21 (1) states that “projects shall be community based in order to ensure that the prospective 
benefits are available to a wide cross-section of the inhabitants of a particular area.” To ensure fiscal sustainability 
of the local projects, Section 21 (3) states that “all projects shall be development projects and may include costs 
related to studies, planning and design of the projects but shall not include recurrent costs of the projects” (GOK, 
CDF Act, 2003). 
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may be costly. This creates fiscal illusions among citizens at the constituency level that local 
projects cost less when in reality they do not. 
Collectively therefore, it appears that most CDF-initiated projects contribute towards the 
growth of the central government’s operating budget3 in Kenya. Though signs of the program’s 
expansion4 are ripe, given its popularity among the Kenyan electorate in terms of helping the 
poor access basic needs, little research has been done to evaluate and estimate the financial 
effects of CDF-funded healthcare projects on the central government’s recurrent budget. This 
paper seeks to fill that void. 
Literature Review 
This study relies on the fiscal federalism and decentralization literature to understand 
how CDF equitably redistributes resources to all the 210 constituencies and how CDF healthcare 
expenditures accomplish the allocative efficiency goal. Fiscal federalism provides insights on the 
role of grants/transfers and their attendant problems. The decentralization literature suggests that 
devolved spending powers encourage local people to funds projects that fit their tastes and 
preferences. The decentralization literature further suggests that citizens often suffer from fiscal 
“illusions” when they engage in public policy decisions which blind them from seeing the 
collective financial costs of their expenditure decisions on the central government’s general fund. 
Fiscal illusions refer to the inability of local decision makers to grasp the collective financial 
costs of their independent expenditure decisions on the overall financial standing of the central 
government (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980).  
                                                        
3 The growth government’s operating budget in this study involves expenses incurred by the central government as a 
result of CDF projects measured as the number of employees, salaries, and costs for equipments to run CDF 
projects. Estimating the recurrent cost needed to operate and maintain capital projects is not only important for 
national budgetary decision making, but it also promotes sound macroeconomic management. 
4 See, Daily Nation, January 24th, 2008.  There is consensus among Kenyan lawmakers that the CDF kitty should be 
increased from 2.5% - 10% of the total government revenue. 
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Fiscal illusion is an adaptation of the concept of the “Tragedy of the Commons” as first 
postulated by Hardin (1968). In his original piece, Hardin imagined a pasture open to all 
herdsmen, who, motivated by self interest, try to keep as many cattle as possible. To maximize 
individual utility on the shared commons, a rational herdsman will seek to add another animal to 
his herd. Since the resources of the commons are limited, adding together the component of 
partial utilities of all rational herdsmen, leads to tragedy for all. To evade such a tragedy, Hardin 
recommended the adoption of either coercive laws to limit exploitation of the shared commons 
or the creation of tax devices that communicate the cost of maintaining the shared commons. 
These recommendations have been adopted in the fiscal decentralization literature to connote the 
benefit-taxation principle (Bahl, 1999). 
In the Kenyan perspective, the tragedy of the commons may be evident given the CDF’s 
current operational structure which blurs the total cost of development projects as a result of the 
independent local decisions that put pressure on the center’s general fund. The problem of the 
commons arises when some government programs that concentrate benefits to certain areas are 
financed from the general fund mainly through transfers (Stein, 1998) and whose collective 
outcome is fiscal deficits.   
The theory of fiscal federalism conceives the organization of the public sector in a more 
or less federal way so that different levels of government provide public services and have some 
scope for de facto decision-making authority irrespective of the formal constitution within a 
nation state (Oates, 1972; 1999). From a normative perspective, fiscal federalism identifies three 
roles for the public sector: macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution and resource 
allocation in the presence of market failure (Oates 1999; Burkhead & Miner 1971). The 
macroeconomic stabilization and income redistribution functions are assigned to the central 
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government while resource allocation function is assigned to sub-national governments (World 
Bank Report 1999/2000).  
 The main benefit associated with a federal fiscal structure is economic efficiency, which 
rests on two assumptions. First, it assumes that a group of individuals who reside in a community 
or region possess tastes and preference patterns that are homogenous and that these tastes and 
preferences differ from those of individuals who live in other communities or regions. And 
second, it assumes that individuals within a region have a better knowledge of the costs and 
benefits of public services of their region (Burkhead & Miner 1971). Thus, resources devoted for 
public purposes should be left to the local people to enhance their preferences for public 
expenditure that optimizes costs (Boadway & Wildasin, 1984).  
Since local regions within a jurisdiction may not be equally endowed with resources, 
intergovernmental grants and transfers are important instruments for allocating resources within 
a federal structure (Gramlich, 1988). For economic efficiency, fiscal federalism literature 
suggests that local jurisdictions use transfers that communicate to its households the cost of 
consuming different levels of public goods (Oates, 1999). 
A federal fiscal structure, however, is not without problems. Once created, it produces a 
new category of interest groups that are geographically located and lobby for greater transfers to 
enable them to provide more vote generating expenditures to their constituents at no additional 
direct tax cost (Grossman 1989). Additionally, a federal fiscal structure financed by transfers 
from the central government, encourages local jurisdictions to ignore the tax collection burdens 
of for financing their expenditures while at the same time increasing public expenditure 
obligations (Joulfaian and Marlow, 1990). The use and adequacy of transfers however, hinges on 
the goals that the national government seeks to advance. If the national goal is to improve the 
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populations’ welfare, then whether transfers export tax burdens to the national government is less 
important. If, however, the goal of the transfers is to free local jurisdictions from the center’s 
dictates and make them sustainable, then transfers that lack a benefit-taxation principle might be 
detrimental. 
A possible remedy for the above problems seems to be the need for clarity in defining a 
jurisdiction’s fiscal responsibilities and the fiscal instruments needed to support the delivery of 
the needed public services (Oates, 1999).   
The literature on decentralization on the other hand, points out that decentralization 
involves the establishment of an arena of decision making that lies outside the influence of the 
central government in which the central government delegates some of its power to local or 
regional administrators which carry out certain functions on their own (Kalaycioglu, 2000). In 
his view, Smith (1985) sees decentralization as the delegation of power to lower levels in a 
territorial hierarchy whether the hierarchy is one of governments within a state or offices within 
a large-scale organization. Further, Smith notes that decentralization can occur in all 
geographical areas such as neighborhoods, field personnel in the area of central departments or 
within a large organization. From a fiscal perspective, decentralization refers to a set of policies 
designed to increase the revenues or fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments (Falleti, 
2005).  Tanzi (2000) notes that fiscal decentralization exists when sub-national governments 
have powers given to them by the constitution or by legislative laws, to raise some taxes and/or 
carry out spending activities within clearly established legal criteria.  
According to Rondinelli and Nellis (1986), decentralization can take three forms: 
deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Under deconcentration, the central government 
shifts some tasks to the local administrative units without allowing local discretion. Under 
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delegation, local jurisdictions have a certain degree of discretion in the provision of public 
services, but they still follow the central government’s directions and requests. Under devolution, 
local jurisdictions are independent decision makers that respond to their residents’ preferences 
and needs in the provision of public services (Kwon, 2003). Though none of these three designs 
works better than the other in terms of satisfying people’s needs, scholars agree that different 
decentralization designs produce different outcomes depending on the existing political and 
economic institutions in a country (Kumar, 2006). Thus, the “success” of any fiscal 
decentralization design can be argued to be context dependent and an acceptable criteria for 
judging success of any fiscal decentralization design, is on how well it serves the presumed 
national policy objectives. 
In most developing countries, fiscal decentralization is promoted as a panacea for the ills 
of centralized structures and its potential benefits.  For one, fiscal decentralization is associated 
with improvement in performance of the public sector through allocative efficiency (Oates, 
1972; Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002). Second, decentralization is associated with improved performance 
on measures of basic needs such as health and education in developing countries (Lindaman & 
Thurmaier, 2002). Third, fiscal decentralization is associated with equity. When resources are 
allocated based on an agreed upon formula, all local jurisdictions are guaranteed a minimum 
level of per capita expenditures for essential services (World Bank Report, 1999/2000). Lastly, 
decentralization brings public services closer to the people unlike centrally planned services 
located in capital cities. Close proximity, it is argued, enhances accountability, autonomy and 
participation (Turner & Hume, 1997).   
Fiscal decentralization however, poses a number of problems. First, especially in 
developing countries, it can be captured by local elites to advance their selfish interests (Boone, 
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2003). Second, it is difficult to assign taxes/transfers to match local spending needs due to 
administrative considerations and access to and sharing of information (Tanzi, 2001). Third, 
decentralization distorts macroeconomic stabilization policies especially when local jurisdictions 
engage in expansionary policies while the national government pursues contractionary policies 
(World Bank Report, 1999/2000; Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002). Lastly, fiscal decentralization may 
result in higher government expenditures due to loss of economies of scale for some services, 
increased public employment due to demands for more public services, and thus additional 
administrative costs for coordination, and auditing (Tanzi, 2001; Turner & Hume, 1997; Oates, 
1985). From a budgetary perspective, fiscal decentralization may be relatively expensive. 
Apart from its policy problems, fiscal decentralization also poses some technical 
problems. First, fiscal decentralization is rarely designed to improve the fiscal discipline or 
reduce the size of government (Stein, 1998). Second, poorly designed decentralization structures 
based on transfers from the central government and where expenditure responsibilities are 
inadequately defined weaken the center’s budgetary constraints due to coordination problems 
(Rodden, 2003).  
In designing a decentralized fiscal structure, policymakers try to answer the question: 
“Who pays for what and how?” (Kalaycioglu, 2000, p. 7).  For decentralization to work 
adequately, those who initiate local capital projects must be accountable to those who pay for 
local projects and those who benefit from those projects. 
Scholars suggest that different fiscal decentralization designs affect the size of 
government with mixed results. On the one hand, those who define “size of government” as a 
ratio of total government receipts to the gross domestic product (GDP), have found positive 
correlations (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; Grossman, 1989; Joulfaian & Marlow, 1990; Rodden 
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2003). These scholars note that fiscal structures that relies on own revenues as opposed to those 
that rely on transfers, negatively correlate with growth of the public sector. On the other hand, 
however, Oates’ studies (1985; 1999) failed to establish such correlations, though from a 
budgetary perspective he noted that fiscal decentralization does increase the central 
government’s overall expenditures. In the Latin American study on fiscal decentralization and 
size of government, Stein (1997) established a positive correlation. From an African perspective, 
little research has been undertaken to examine how various decentralization schemes have 
affected the size of the public sector. This paper attempts to fill that void. 
 Fiscal decentralization in Kenya through CDF in this project is conceived as a delegated 
form of decentralization because constituencies enjoy some form of discretion in expenditure 
decision making although they have to follow central government’s directions and requests. For 
instance, constituencies use CDF funds to build clinics but expect the central government to 
bring such clinic into operation by employing new nurses, supplying drugs and incurring regular 
maintenance costs. The costs of running two or three clinics in one constituency may not appear 
to be much but collectively such costs across the entire country may be monstrous for the 
Ministry of Health (MOH). Thus, a failure to grasp the ‘true’ cost of running such projects 
creates fiscal illusions on recipients of such services to view public services as ‘free.’ Fiscal 
illusions as a result of independent constituency-level decisions are likely to exhaust the common 
pool resources and thus, aggravate the problem of the commons. These issues call for attention to 
address the budgetary implications of fiscal decentralization. 
Research Problem 
The central problem in this study is: How has fiscal decentralization through CDF 
affected the central government’s operating budget?  Addressing this problem is vital in 
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understanding the long-term financial implications of decentralization policies on the central 
government’s operating budget. Sound public management skills require estimates for recurrent 
expenditures of capital investment projects be presented along with capital spending proposals. 
For budget decision making, it is paramount to estimate the operations and maintenance 
expenditures needed to run a capital project at a level consistent with its expected use and to 
maintain its capacity during its expected lifetime (Hood, Husband & Yu, 2002).  
Measures of the center’s operating budget will be limited to input measures, i.e., direct 
costs of new employees (clinical nurses) as a result of CDF projects, their salaries and the 
attendant pension and fringe benefits. The indirect costs for operating CDF projects include: drug 
kits and maternity kits, other expenses incurred in operating a new clinic such as electricity, 
water, telephone and other periodic maintenance needed to maintain the clinics. Figure 2 below 
sketches the agenda for this study. 
Figure 2 
A Recursive Fiscal Decentralization Causal Model for the Growth of Government 
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Variables Identification 
X1 = District population size 
X2 = Poverty – Number of poor people per district 
X3 = Health expenditures for capital projects 
X4 = Total annual CDF allocations 
X5 = Growth of government 
r12 = An unanalyzed correlation between X1 & X2 
Path Equations 
 X3 = P31X1 + P32X2 + P3Ew   [1] 
 X4 = P41X1 + P42X2 + P43X3 + P4Eu  [2] 
 X5 = P53X3 + P54X4 + P5Ev   [3] 
From the structural equation above, the dependent variable in this project is the growth of 
the central government’s operating budget (X5). The exogenous variables include: district 
population sizes and poverty - measured by the total number of poor people per district. The 
endogenous variables include: total healthcare expenditures (X3) for the same period and total 
annual CDF allocation for fiscal years 2004/05 – 2006/07 (X4). 
Hypotheses 
 To answer the above research question(s), this study will test the following five 
hypotheses: 
H1a: Based on constituency/district characteristics, CDF allocations formula promotes 
equity in resource distribution. 
H1b:  Health expenditure decisions correlate with local population and poverty rates and 
this determines need for healthcare services.  
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H2: CDF-initiated projects are positively related to increases in the personnel (direct) and 
indirect costs of the central government’s recurrent budget.  
Hypothesis H1a and H1b, in this project borrows from the WB Report that notes 
decentralization promotes equity and from Lindaman and Thurmaier’s findings that fiscal 
decentralization is positively related to better performance on measures of basic needs such as 
healthcare and education (Lindaman & Thurmaier, 2002).  
In H2: I hypothesize that an increase of the number of CDF-funded healthcare clinics will 
be accompanied by an increase in both direct labor and indirect costs on the central 
government’s operating budget in the Ministry of Health (MOH).  
Method, Data and Research Design 
This study employs a nested analysis approach to probe the three hypotheses identified 
above. A nested analysis approach (NAA) is a mixed strategy of research which combines the 
statistical analysis of a large sample of cases with an in-depth investigation of one or more cases 
contained within the larger sample (Leiberman, 2005).  Under NAA, statistical analyses serve as 
guide posts from which primary causal inferences are derived and which ultimately lead to 
quantitative estimates for the robustness of a theoretical model. Equipped with a robust 
theoretical model, the research proceeds to conduct an in-depth inquiry through interviews or 
observations as a way of tracing causal chains within cases across time (ibid, 435).  
The aim of an in-depth inquiry of one or more cases in this design is to “thicken” and 
contextualize concepts that are well suited for descriptions and to make inferences about simple 
causation on a smaller scale to which a large sample analysis (LSA) is poorly suited (Coppedge, 
1999). A nested analysis therefore compliments the advantage of generalizability of a LSA with 
the contextually based evidence drawn from an in-depth inquiry of a few cases. The main 
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advantage of the LSA with robust statistical inferences, is that it narrows the menu for executing 
an in-depth analysis of a few cases and takes advantage of the context based evidence from in-
depth inquiry to enrich the findings of a theoretical causal model that it actually works as 
specified (Lieberman, 2005; 440).  
In this study, all the 210 parliamentary jurisdictions referred herein as constituencies and 
categorized into their respective districts (68 in total excluding Nairobi) form the unit of analysis 
from which the LSA model as shown in figure 2 above. From the healthcare sector, a total of 
seven dispensaries from six constituencies in three districts (Gucha, Kisumu & Migori) were 
selected for in-depth analysis. With a sample of 210 constituencies categorized into 68 districts 
assembled for LSA, statistical analyses were conducted first to test the allocative efficiency 
hypothesis i.e. whether expenditure decisions at the local level correlate with local preferences. 
Second, a path analysis of the theoretical recursive fiscal decentralization causal model was 
analyzed as shown in figure 2 above to probe how the collective financial effects of devolved 
funds and the attendant health capital projects in relation to local preferences affect the central 
government’s recurrent budget.  
Through a LSA, a recursive causal model in figure 2 above is helpful in decomposing 
correlations between any two variables into simple and compound paths and thus enables us to 
measure the direct and indirect effects one variable has on another (Asher, 1983). Unlike 
ordinary linear regression, causal or path analysis allows a researcher to move beyond the direct 
effects of independent variables on the dependent variable as provided by basic regression 
outputs. It allows us to estimate the magnitude of causal linkages between variables and such 
estimates provide us with information about an underlying causal process (McClendon, 2002). 
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In view of a NAA, the robustness of the above causal model enables this study to search 
for explanations about how fiscal decentralization in Kenya through the CDF based on district 
characteristics has contributed to the growth of government. For these reasons, loosely structured 
interviews and a focus group were conducted to examine the costs related to running health 
facilities from month to month or day to day with the intention of increasing our inferential 
confidence about the financial implications of CDF projects on the center’s operating budget.  
To account for the need for healthcare services, I collected and used data on the 
distribution of nurses per district. Since the government employs only nurses in the new 
dispensaries, their salaries and fringe benefits were used. The direct labor cost (DC) was 
estimated by multiplying the average salary (S) of a newly hired nurse by total number of nurses 
expected to be employed and deployed to all completed and gazetted CDF dispensaries. Fringe 
benefits for nurses employed in Kenya include; risk allowance, medical allowance, uniform 
allowance and house allowance. The indirect costs (IC) for running most CDF dispensaries 
include: telephone, transport, a drug kit (supplied quarterly), and water fees. Using SPSS, I ran 
correlations matrices to determine whether first, CDF allocations are based on the stated official 
formula based on population sizes and the district poverty levels (H1a,). And second, whether 
healthcare expenditures correlate with local need (H1b). Having established correlations, I 
proceeded to test my theoretical model. Table 1 below provides an annual cost estimate of 
running a CDF healthcare facility (dispensary). The estimate was constructed from field 
interviews and from a MOH preliminary estimate. 
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Table 1 
An Annual Item Budget Estimate for Operating One CDF 
Dispensary 
Item  Quantity 
    Amount           
(Ksh) 
    Amount     
US($)a 
Nurse Salaries 2 Nurses 430,000.00 6,142.86 
Medicine - Drug 
Kit @ 3x 1,200,000.00 17,142.86 
Operations &  
Maintenance 170,000.00 2,428.57 
Utilities Transport 9,000.00 128.57 
  Phone 6,000.00 85.71 
  Water 3,000.00 42.86 
Total   1,818,000.00 25,971.43 
      Source: MOH, 2008; & Field interviews conducted in July, 2008. 
a. Calculation of amount in US $ based on an exchange rate of $1 = Ksh.70 
 
Growth of government (GG) is the sum of DC and IC associated with new health projects 
calculated by multiplying the  (S) of the expected number of nurses in each gazetted dispensary 
by the total number of completed and gazette dispensaries in each district. The IC was calculated 
by multiplying the expected annual cost of running one CDF-build dispensary (telephone, 
transport and drug kits) by the total number of gazetted dispensaries per district. Both the DC 
and the IC for each district were then summed up to create the dependent variable GG.  
Data and Case Selection 
Data for this study was obtained from both primary and secondary sources. For the latter 
from which the LSA was conducted, data was obtained from the CDF’s official website 
www.cdf.go.ke/ . Other sources include: the Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) – for financial data, and the Central Bureau of Statistics (the defunct Kenya Bureau of 
Statistics – for district level variables. From primary sources, one ad hoc5 focus group and a total 
                                                        
5 I refer the focus groups as ad hoc, because it was unplanned and was conducted with mothers who were waiting to 
be seen with their children by the duty nurse in one of my interview sites. As I waited to interview my informant, I 
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of eighteen (18) in-depth loosely structured interviews were conducted in a total of eight 
constituencies in six districts. Of the eighteen interviews conducted, two interviews were with 
senior informants at the CDF’s national Management Board (NMB) and two with senior 
informants in the MOF. The main goal in these in-depth interviews was to learn how a local 
CDF-constructed dispensary/clinic was run on a day-to-day or month-to-month basis. Particular 
emphasis was placed on financial matters related to the cost of drugs, transport, telephone, water 
and electric expenses and any other financial help provided to local dispensaries from the central 
government. 
All the interviews were recorded through note taking or jottings made at the time of the 
interviews, and then typed transcripts were created from such notes soon afterwards, more often 
that same day. All the interviews were conducted in English with a few intrudes of Swahili 
which I translated. On average, the interviews lasted for approximately 20-30 minutes. 
This study conceives the CDF as a fiscal decentralization case whose aim is to test the 
theoretical hypotheses advanced in the literature that decentralization policies promote allocative 
efficiency. As a case study, the CDF provides an opportunity to probe the budgetary 
ramifications of a delegated form of fiscal decentralization. Gerring (2004) defines a case study 
as an intensive study of a single unit with the aim of generalizing across a larger set of units. He 
notes that a case study relies on “some sort of covariational evidence utilized in non-case study 
research” (342). 
The use of careful case studies to compliment findings from quantitative variables can be 
a useful design that bridges shortfalls of a general theory as hypothesized by quantitative 
variables. Case studies in particular, can isolate aspects of a theory that are not explained by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
decided to engage the waiting young and old mothers on their attitudes and perception towards their CDF healthcare 
facility.  
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general factors. In line with NAA, Coppedge (2005) argues that a case study allow researchers to 
select cases whose job is to explain aspects of interest that are not well explained by the general 
factors. Case studies are also important in bridging the gap that exists between qualitative and 
quantitative methods through what is commonly called “process tracing.” As a method, process 
tracing helps researchers look closely at the decision process by which various initial conditions 
are translated into outcomes (Tarrow, 2005). In the same breathe Gerring (2004) notes that a case 
study allows one to peer into the box of causality to the intermediate causes lying between some 
cause and its purported effect  i.e. they allow one to see X and Y interact. From a fiscal 
decentralization perspective, Rodden (2003) argues that careful case studies are helpful in 
clarifying causal mechanism that link fiscal structures and government spending. 
Although researchers commonly select cases for analysis because of pragmatic reasons 
such as access, cost, expertise and time or for methodological reasons because a case is 
considered typical, diverse, extreme deviant or most similar, under NAA, cases are purposively 
selected so as to trace the inferential process in a theoretical model and to examine how the case 
fits in the theoretically specified population (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Although purposive 
sampling is dogged with generalization problems (Schutt, 2001), this problem is solved by the 
LSA and thus makes random sampling obsolete (Lieberman, 2005). 
A purposive sampling strategy was employed to select informants and constituencies 
based on both pragmatic reasons (access, safety and time) and methodological reasons 
(healthcare projects were the most typical and most similar projects undertaken by almost all the 
210 constituencies). In addition, selection of cases in all the seven constituencies was based on 
district characteristics such as population (urban/rural) and poverty indices. Table 2 below shows 
the selection criteria based on district characteristics.  
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Selection of informants for interviews was based on pragmatic reasons i.e. accessibility 
and safety. Besides, informants had to be people with knowledge on how the CDF-funded clinics 
are run. In this respect, only nurses-in-charge or their immediate assistants were interviewed.6 
Through their stories and experiences, I was able to learn how much it costs to run a local clinic, 
what major expenses were routinely incurred, what kind of help they received from the central 
government, cost-sharing between the government and the local community, frequency of drug 
supply from the central government and the citizens’ perceptions of the local health facilities. 
Table 2 
Constituency Selection Based on District Characteristics 
District 
District 
Poverty 
Index Constituency Rural/Urban 
Gucha 67.2 Bomachoge Rural 
Kisumu 49 
Kisumu West Urban 
Kisumu East Urban 
Nyando 48.3 
Nyakachi Rural 
Nyando Rural 
Migori 43.1 
Migori Urban 
Rongo Rural 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Based on Kenya Integrated Household 
Budget Survey (KIHBS) - 2005/06. 
 
Counting 
I manually counted and constructed a list all CDF healthcare initiated projects in all the 
210 constituencies in sixty eight (68) districts.  Of the 210 constituencies, twenty four (24) 
constituencies were excluded from a manual count for two reasons. One, because the 
constituencies either did not file a final report detailing the various projects undertaken in the 
constituencies or the constituencies are/were yet to file and upload their reports on the CDF’s 
                                                        
6 Given the remoteness of the location of most of these facilities, my efforts to contact informants prior to my 
planned visit were futile. To overcome this difficulty, I scheduled morning impromptu visits with the help of a local 
native that also served as a driver.  
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official website. Second, some constituencies were omitted because of poor record keeping i.e. 
their records did not indicate whether projects were on-going or complete.7 Since a number of 
health related projects included construction of new clinics or renovations of existing ones, I 
categorized and counted only projects that had been started by the CDF funds. Existing health 
clinics that had been renovated with the CDF funds were deliberately left out because I presumed 
they were already operational and did not therefore alter current government’s operating cost. I 
then divided CDF-funded clinics into two categories; On-going and Completed projects. 
Healthcare projects in different constituencies were identified by different phrases with some 
being called dispensaries, some maternity wings and others went by the label health centers. The 
counting exercise yielded a total of 1381 health projects that the MOH lumped together as 
dispensaries of which 975 were identified as on-going and 406 were categorized as completed as 
of the end of 2006/07 fiscal year. 
For analysis, all constituencies were grouped into their respective districts and then into 
their provinces. The rationale for grouping constituencies into their respective districts was 
because constituencies do not have central data banks for collecting and storing relevant data 
other than CDF-related activities but district headquarters do. With my categorized list at hand, I 
manually matched my list of CDF-healthcare facilities with the official list obtained from the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) for all CDF health facilities that had been gazetted as of September, 
2007.8  As of this date, a total of 1039 facilities had been gazetted most of which matched with 
my manually constructed list. Although my manual list indicated that a total of 406 projects had 
been completed, the official list showed a significantly higher number. A closer scrutiny revealed 
                                                        
7 For the excluded constituencies, their records mostly indicated the amount spent for healthcare projects without 
being specific on the nature or progress of the projects i.e. whether the projects were renovations or new 
constructions.   
8 Gazettement of facilities in Kenya implies that the government has taken over the ownership and running of the 
institution. It therefore requires the government to incur the both the recurrent and capital costs of the gazetted 
facility. 
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that some of the projects that I had categorized as on-going had actually been completed prior to 
being gazetted. This discrepancy could be associated with poor record keeping at the 
constituency level that did not update changes. 
Analyzing Financial Data 
Although the CDF was started in 2003/04 fiscal year, I concentrated my analysis on 
healthcare expenditure for three fiscal years i.e. 2004/05; 2005/06 & 2006/07. Fiscal year 
2003/04 was skipped from the analysis for two reasons. First, in 2003/04 all the 210 
constituencies were allocated an equal amount of Kshs. 6 million and this first allocation did not 
consider regional disparities, thus no variation. Second, the 2003/04 fiscal year in this research 
serves as a time lag in which it is presumed that most local projects were either started or 
conceived.  
All the yearly allocations for each constituency in each district were summed up to obtain 
total allocations for each district for the three fiscal years. For the district level population sizes, I 
used both the 1999 population and the population growth projections for 2007. The rationale for 
using both data sets was because the last population census was carried in 1999 and the next 
census is scheduled for 2009. Additionally, the use of the 1999 population census was begged on 
the rationale that when the CDF was created in 2003, policymakers relied on the disparities in 
district development as reported by the census data. It was presumed that the creation of CDF 
was meant to address those regional disparities as revealed in the 1999 population census. Since 
population growth has not been static, I decided to use the districts’ projected population sizes 
for 2007 to examine whether any discrepancies exists. Importantly, the use of 2007 population 
projection was chosen because the Kenya Bureau of Statistics (KBS) used the same projections 
as mandated by the Kenyan parliament to calculate incidences of poverty at the constituency 
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level to ensure that the yearly allocations formula took cognizance of poverty levels at the local 
level (GOK – KBS, 2005). 
Empirical Findings 
Has the constituency development fund led to the growth of the central government’s 
operating budget? Based on the district characteristics of population sizes and poverty indices, 
does the CDF allocation formula address equity concerns as envisioned in the CDF Act? The 
literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization often evoke claims of equity and allocative 
efficiency for devolved or transferred resources under a decentralized system of government. In 
regard to the former (equity), the literature suggests that when resources under a decentralized 
system are allocated to various local jurisdictions based on an agreed upon formula, all local 
units are at least guaranteed a minimum level of per capita expenditures. How does the CDF 
measure to these theoretical claims? Below I offer my preliminary research findings. 
Since this study focuses on the heath-care projects initiated through the CDF funds, the 
best place to assess any real or imagined budgetary increases would be the trend of annual 
budgetary allocations for the Ministry of Health (MOH). Since the CDF was started in 2003, a 
graphical analysis of MOH recurrent and capital/development budgetary allocations five years 
prior and five years after the start of the program should give us reason to believe that the CDF 
has had some financial effects. Figures 3 and 4 below show the net approved recurrent and 
development budget allocations’ trend for the MOH for fiscal years 1998/1999 – 2007/2008 
respectively.  
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Source: GOK: Annual Budget Estimates for Recurrent & Development Expenditures   for Fiscal Years 
1997/98-2007/08. 
 
In figure 3 above, it can be observed that the recurrent budget expenditure trend 
seems to follow a constant upward trajectory. This constant rise suggests that the CDF program 
has not affected the MOH’s recurrent budget for the past five years. This finding is not surprising 
given that in 1992 the government of Kenya adopted a hiring freeze in the civil service including 
in the health and education sectors as a cost cutting measure that aimed at reducing the central 
government’s total wage bill (GOK, 1992). Although the government has shown interest in 
reviewing this hiring freeze policy in critical sectors such as healthcare and education, the MOH 
is currently guided by that policy which has set a ceiling on the total number of nurses that the 
ministry can hire at 17,000 nationally as stipulated in the 1992 civil service reform (interview 
with MOH informant – 27th June, 2008). It is in this respect that the recurrent budget as shown in 
figure 3 above has not had dramatic financial effects in relation to the CDF health projects. The 
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lack of dramatic financial change however, should be examined with caution because in the last 
financial year 2007/2008, the MOH through its agency – Kenya Medical Supplies Agency 
(KEMSA) – owed eighteen (18) pharmaceutical vendors over $22.8 million for drugs and 
medical supplies delivered to a number of health facilities in the country.9 
The MOH’s development budget as seen in Figure 4 below however, shows a constant 
trend of allocations for fiscal years 1997/98 - 2003/2004 but this trend starts to change upwardly 
for fiscal years 2004/05 – 2007/08.  As alluded to elsewhere in this study, fiscal year 2003/04 is 
considered a time lag for projects implementation since the CDF program was started in the 
middle of 2003.  Table 4 below more clearly depicts the development budget expenditure trend 
for the past ten years. 
 
Source: GOK: Annual Budget Estimates for Recurrent & Development Expenditures   for Fiscal 
Years 1997/98-2007/08. 
 
                                                        
9  See, “KEMSA Owes Drug Suppliers Shs. 1.6 Billion” The East African Standard, 09/15/2008. Conversion of 
Kenya Shilling assumed an exchange rate of $1 = Ksh. 70.  
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It is evident from figure 4 above that from fiscal year 2004/05 onwards, the capital 
budget of the MOH has been appreciating at a higher rate than it was the case prior to the 
creation of CDF. In fiscal year 2004/05 for instance, one and half years after the creation of 
CDF, the MOH’s capital budegt appriciated by over US$ 43.2 million which representes about 
125% (per cent) budget increase from the previous year. In the succeeding fiscal years 2005/06 
and 2006/07, the MOH’s capital budget continued to increase at a rate of about 26.2% 
(US$20.36 million) and 12.7% (US$12.48million) respectively (GOK, Budget Estimates 
2005/06-2007/08). These budgetary increases are a contrast to the three years prior to the 
creation of the CDF. For fiscal year 1999/00, for instance, the MOH’s capital budget appriciated 
by 10% (US$1.48 million) only to be slashed by 10.3% (US$1.68 million) in 2000/01 financial 
year. Although the Ministry’s capital budget appriciated by 12.2%  (US$1.79 million) in 2001/02 
fiscal year, such an increase only brought capital funding to its previous funding level in the 
preceding fiscal year. 
While the main focus of this study is the financial implication of CDF projects on the 
central government’s operating budget, in the Kenyan case capital budgets and capital 
improvement plans are not clearly distinguished from operating costs. Although it is difficult to 
clearly differentiate capital from operating expenses, often capital expenditures refer to “fixed 
assests of considereable value” (Rubin, 1997: p.173). Such a definition implies that a capital item 
is an item that has a lifespan/usage of a year or more and costs more than a predetermined 
minimum amount. The key in capital items categorization is a predetermined minimum amount 
and this often depends on the size of the budget, size of jurisdiction and the prefernce of the 
governing body (Ibid; Vogt, 2004). In this regard, expenditures such as buildings or vehicle 
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refurbishings may constitute a capital expenditure for smaller jurisdictions but may be 
considered operating costs for big sized-budgets and juridictions. 
In Kenya and in line with figure 4 above, categorization of capital and operating 
expenditures is predetrmined by codes enumerated in the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
manual which lamps together all kinds of maintenance as operating costs ( GOK-MOF 2001). 
For example, regular maintenance of computers or software instalations and maintenance of 
roads, ports and jetties fall under the same category of expenses (ibid). Since regular 
maintenance of capital projects fall under operating costs in the Kenyan context, it can be infered 
from figure 4 above that CDF healthcare projects have financial implications on the MOH’s 
operating budget. From a MOH’s estimates, such financial implications of CDF healthcare 
projects can be discerned  from table 3 below. 
Table 3 
An Annual Operating Cost Estimate for a New Dispensary 
 
 Item Cost (Ksh) 
1 Start up Equipment 500,000 
2 2 Nurses Personal Emolments 
(PE) 
430,000 
4 Drug Kits – Supplied Quarterly 1,200,000 
5 Operational & Maintenance 170,000 
6 Total 2,300,000 
                    Source: MOH – an Unofficial Budget Estimate  (2008) Developed by MOH’s     
       Finance Officers. Estimates also corroborated with field interviews. 
 
As table 3 above shows, and as many items in the MOH’s budget reveal, categorization 
of capital items is based on predetermined codes in the GFS manual. This categorization 
therefore reveals that it is possible for capital items within the MOH’s budget to increase the 
total operating budget without necessary increasing PE as a result of hiring additional employees. 
The graphical analysis as shown in figure 4 above and through deductive reasoning seem to 
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suggest that CDF healthcare capital projects have a postive effect on the central government’s 
operating budget.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Using the two exogenous variables: district population size (X1) and district poverty 
levels (X2), hypothesis (H1a) tests the veracity of the CDF allocations (X4) formula. Simply put, 
are allocations based on district characteristics? CDF allocations are expected to be positively 
correlated to district/constituemcy characteristics. Also, expenditure decisions on health care 
projects are expected to be positively influenced by district population characteristics (H1b) i.e. 
size and poverty. Table 4 below shows the correlations of distict variables and CDF allocations 
for fiscal years 2004/05 – 2006/07 per district. 
Table 4 
Correlations between CDF Allocations and District Variables 
Allocations Population Povertya 
Total 2004/05 –2006/07 .899** .766** 
Fiscal Year 2004/05 .900** .765** 
Fiscal Year 2005/06 .899** .766** 
Fiscal Year 2006/07 .899** .766** 
               **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
  a - Poverty operationalized as the total number of poor people per district 
  
The strong and positive associations as shown in table 4 above suggest that annual CDF 
allocations are correlated with constituency characteristics such as population sizes and poverty 
levels as measured at the district level. These correlations further suggests that densely populated 
districts/constituencies with high poverty indices receive more funds than districts that are less 
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populated and have fewer people living under poverty. This strong associations further suggest 
that based on the allocation formula, the CDF appears to address the question of equity based on 
district population sizes and the number of poor people per district. The Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS) developed the following formula to allocate the CDF as equitably as possible to 
each of the 210 constituencies in Kenya. 
CDFund Allocated = [(0.75x (CDF)] + (0.25xCDF) x Weighted contribution Poverty 
Where: CDFund is the Constituency Development Fund allocated to each constituency. CDF is 
the total net CDF allocation (after netting out 3% administrative budget and 5% constituency 
emergency budget) and the weighted poverty contribution of each constituency to the national 
poverty. 
With regard to the operationalization of poverty, the enactment of the CDF act in 2004 
mandated the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) to develop and use poverty estimates for 
constituencies to allocate the program’s funds. Using quantitative measures of poverty, the CBS 
constructed a function of consumption expenditures relative to a poverty line. The monetary 
indicators of well-being were developed by measuring poverty based on detailed information 
regarding household consumption expenditures on food and a comprehensive range of non-food 
items such as schooling, health, transport and rent (GOK, 2005). 
In Kenya, the poverty threshold or poverty line below which people are classified as poor 
based on the total monthly consumption expenditures per person is estimated at Kshs. 1,846 
($26) in rural areas and Kshs. 4,425 ($63) at the urban areas. This poverty line is determined 
based on the expenditure required to purchase a food basket that allows minimum nutritional 
requirements to be met (set at 2250 calories per adult equivalent per day) in addition to meeting 
basic non-food needs. In Kenya this poverty line is estimated to be about Kshs. 1,239 ($17) and 
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Kshs.2,648 ($38) for rural and urban areas respectively (Ibid). Based on the 1999 Kenya 
Population and Housing Census, it was established that the share of urban poor to rural poor was 
about 19% and 81% respectively.  
Do district poverty levels and total population sizes influence CDF healthcare 
expenditure decisions? Based on findings of prior studies on decentralization this study tests the 
hypothesis that [H1b] health expenditure decisions correlate with local population size and 
poverty rates and this determines the need for healthcare services. Table 5 below shows the 
correlations between health expenditures and district level variables. 
Table 5 
Correlations (r) between Health Expenditures & District Variables 
Health Expenditures Population Poverty Nurses 
Total 2004/05-06/07 .63** .63** .38** 
Fiscal Year 2004/05 .54** .50** .32** 
Fiscal Year 2005/06 .50** .57** .26** 
Fiscal Year 2006/07 .56** .50** .40** 
       **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 As indicated in table 5 above, there appears to be a somewhat strong correlation between 
the amount spent on CDF health projects and the district population size and poverty levels. This 
suggests that densely populated districts with relatively high numbers of poor people are likely to 
spend their CDF allocations on health projects. The need for healthcare services can be 
operationalized in a number of ways. For instance, high rates of infant mortality or lower life 
expectancy rates are often used to measure the wellness/health of a community. Additionally, 
availability and accessibility of healthcare service providers may be used to determined or 
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measure a community’s healthcare needs. In this regard, absence of healthcare providers such as 
nurses may signify need for the services of such professionals. This research utilized data on 
nurse distribution per district to gauge healthcare needs at the local level. Although table 5 above 
shows that the association between health expenditures and the distribution on nurses per district 
is significant, it is however weak. This weak relationship suggests that CDF health expenditures 
do not correlate strongly with the available number of nurses per district. It further suggests that 
few nurses are currently available at the district level and thus an increase of health care capital 
projects will positively affect the distribution of nurses per district. This finding is in line with 
the notion of allocative efficiency and the basic needs literature under a decentralized system. It 
is therefore expected that as the number of CDF healthcare projects increase, so will the number 
of nurses employed to run those clinics to meet the local healthcare need.   
To test hypotheses H2(a): CDF-initiated projects are positively related to 
increases in the personnel (direct) costs of the central government’s recurrent budget and   
H2(b): CDF-initiated projects are correlated with the increases in non-personnel (indirect) costs 
of the central government’s outlays, I estimated a recursive (one-way direction of causality) of 
the fiscal decentralization model as identified in figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5 
Fiscal Decentralization Causal Model with Path Coefficients Indicating How Both the 
Exogenous and Endogenous Variables Might Affect Government Growth 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As stated elsewhere in this study, o 
The main advantage of path analysis is that it enables a researcher to measure/estimate 
the direct and indirect effects that one variable has on another. The path coefficients in figure 6 
above are the Betas (standardized coefficients) obtained through ordinary regression technique. 
To obtain the coefficients, I regressed X5 on X4 & X3. I repeated the same procedure by 
regressing X4 on X1, X2, and X3 and finally I regressed X3 on both X1 and X2. All the coefficients 
are statistically significant. As shown, the error terms; Eu, Ev, and Ew in the causal model are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the equation. 
From figure 5 above, it can be seen that district population size (X1) and levels of poverty 
(X2) directly affect healthcare expenditure decisions (X3) and the amount of CDF allocated to 
each district (X4). District population sizes and the number of poor people per district appear to 
indirectly contribute to the growth of government through healthcare capital projects and through 
the CDF program. The healthcare capital projects however, appear to have direct effect on the 
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growth of government has hypothesized in H2a and H2b. Additionally, the existence of the 
program itself X4 appears to directly contribute  towards the growth of government.   
It should be noted that the independent variable aX4 and the dependent variable bX5 in 
figure 6above have been superscripted because they have been transformed from linear to 
quadratic functions. The transformations10 were undertaken so as to obtain the functions that best 
fit the data. This means that the relationship between CDF allocations and growth of government 
is curvilinear. Thus, an increase of CDF allocations does not necessarily increase the size of 
government. The quadratic functions improved the variance explained from about (R2) 23% to 
about (R2) 42%. That is, both the healthcare expenditures on capital projects and the yearly CDF 
allocation explain about 42% of growth in the central government’s operating budget in the 
MOH. Table 6 below shows the results of the direct and indirect effects of both the exogenous 
and endogenous on the growth of government.  
Table 6 
The Direct, Indirect and Total Effects of Exogenous and Endogenous Variables on the 
Growth of Government 
Variable Direct  
Effects 
Indirect  
Effects 
Total  
Effects 
District population size 
(X1) 
__ .49 .49 
Poverty – No. of poor 
people per district (X2) 
__ .25 .25 
Health capital 
expenditures (X3) 
.38 .12 .50 
Total CDF Allocations 
(X4) 
.48 __ .48 
 
  
                                                        
10 The transformations were hierarchically performed – starting from the simplest linear function and then proceeded 
step by step to add variables representing each successive higher power of X, and testing at each step whether the 
power of X added at that step significantly improved the fit. For more information on function transformation see 
McClendon, (2002) Multiple Regression and Causal Analysis. 
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As indicated in table 6 above and as hypothesized in this study, healthcare capital 
expenditures seem to have the greatest total (direct and indirect) contribution (.50) on the growth 
of government. The district/constituencies’ populations size has the highest total indirect effect 
(.49) on the central government’s operating budget through the amount of CDF allocated and 
through healthcare capital expenditures. The annual CDF allocations however, have the greatest 
direct effects (.48) on the growth of government. This is no surprise because the central 
government in the last two years has hired constituency fund managers deployed to each of the 
210 constituencies to monitor expenditure decisions (Interview with CDF- NMB Informant, 
7/10/2008). Poverty at the district level as determined by the total number of poor people per 
district appears to have an indirect effect (.25) on the growth of government through its impact as 
a factor on the CDF allocation formula. Levels of poverty seem to have an influence on the 
healthcare projects undertaken and this subsequently leads to the growth of government. 
Logically, these findings suggest that a jurisdiction’s population can grow without having 
a direct effect on the central government’s budgetary outlays. However, population growth may 
put pressure on existing services such as healthcare facilities and create new service demands to 
cater for the additional population. To ameliorate such pressures for more services, the central 
government may be forced to respond by creating programs such the CDF. The creation of such 
programs appear to have direct effects on the central government’s operating budget in terms of 
new employees that have to be hired to run such a program and provide the required services. 
Discussion 
 Prior literature suggests that fiscal decentralization and federalism promotes allocative 
efficiency and the attainment of basic needs at the local levels. At the same time, several scholars 
speculate that a delegated form of decentralization or a decentralization design that relies on 
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transfers from the central government tends to increase the size of the central government. As 
Oates (1999) suggests, decentralization designs that are funded by the central government with 
poor coordination mechanisms tend to loosen budgetary constraints thus increasing the total 
outlays incurred by the central government. This paper has tried to account for how such 
“loosening” of budgetary constraints in Kenya’s fiscal decentralization model have been 
exemplified by the CDF. It finds that health capital expenditures initiated at the local level tend 
to contribute to that growth of government. This growth is particularly influenced by the number 
of new employees hired by the central government in its quest to bring local capital projects into 
operation. Because the constituencies do not have their own independent sources of revenue to 
pay for the recurrent costs, any effort by the central government to make local health projects 
operational amount to a tax export for the general population.  
As reviewed above, all the hypotheses in the fiscal decentralization and the growth of 
government model are consistent with the previous studies on fiscal federalism and 
decentralization. Importantly, this study finds that the CDF program promotes equity and 
allocative efficiency. The fiscal decentralization model also finds that health capital expenditures 
initiated at the local level tend to contribute towards the growth of government. This growth is 
particularly influenced by the number of new employees hired by the central government in its 
quest to bring local capital projects into operation. The growth is also caused by the quarterly 
medical supplies that the central government commits itself upon gazzetting CDF clinics. 
Because constituencies do not have their own independent sources of revenue to pay for the 
recurrent costs, any effort by the central government to make local healthcare projects 
operational amounts to a tax export to the general population.  
 37
Export of tax burdens to the general population risks depleting common pool resources 
available to the central government for the provision of other services. While the government has 
been active in bring into operation over six hundred (600) completed healthcare facilities, it has 
recently acknowledged pressure on the common pool resources especially in the MOH’s budget 
for  its inability to bringing into operation another four hundred (400) or so clinics due to lack of 
resources. As quipped by the MOH’s Chief Nursing Officer (CNO), “implementation of health 
projects must incorporate health officials to avoid misappropriation of funds …..it does not make 
sense to put up buildings that will not serve the people.”11 Based on an earlier annual item budget 
estimate for operating one CDF-funded clinic12 bringing four hundred (400) clinics into 
operation will cost the central government an extra Ksh. 720 billion (US$. 10.3 million). With 
the MOH’s net approved annual operating budget for fiscal year 2007/08 amounting to Ksh. 
23,671,442,070 (US$. 338,163,458) incurring an extra US$ 10.3 million from the MOH’s budget 
encourages resource distortions.  As the CNO infers, the current implementation of CDF projects 
is poorly and loosely coordinated with central ministries and such loose coordination 
mechanisms have budgetary implications such as loss of resource control. Besides, 
implementation of over a thousand healthcare facilities within a span of four years in over two 
hundred locations strips off the advantages of economies of scale and undercuts planning efforts. 
 Since health benefits from CDF clinics are concentrated in specific local areas, there is 
need for the government to amend the current CDF act so that a portion of the annual CDF 
allocations to the constituencies is set aside to finance the operations and maintenance of local 
                                                        
11  See, “400 CDF-funded Hospitals Lie Idle Countrywide,” East African Standard, 10/19/2008. 
12 See, page 28, Table 3 for an estimate for operating a CDF-funded clinic. The start-up equipment cost (US$. 7,000) 
has been factored out because from my manual count and analysis of constituency data, evidence suggested that 
most constituencies do incur that cost from their own annual allocations. My interview with a senior informant in the 
CDF national management board (NMB) concurred in what he referred to as “bending rules and cutting corners” to 
dodge CDF rules by approving multiple projects within one grand project. That is, approving more than one project 
e.g. buying equipments as separate projects within a completed clinic which by itself constitute a project. The CDF 
act prohibits constituencies from using funds to incur recurrent costs. 
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projects. This would imply that fewer, operational and manageable clinics will be constructed 
and costs for running such clinics will be factored into the local level expenditure decisions to 
evoke a benefit-expenditure principle equivalent to a tax-benefit principle in a devolved system. 
In the long run, a benefit-expenditure principle from CDF annual allocations will enable the 
Kenyan central government to avoid the tragedy of the commons. 
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